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INCh thue 1930s, comnuer-cial hanuks buave been
permitted to offer only a limnited nanuge of financial
services. At the sanue time, fir-msenugaged in muon-
financial activities, as well as somne in financial
industries, have not been pernnitted to owmu banks.
Such restrictions were intended to limit the misk of
bank failure, to avoid conflicts of intem-est and to
prevent undue concentn-ation of financial power-.’
In r-ecent years, however-, the separation between
banking and othuem- activities has been relaxed
somewhat; what’s mom-c, Congress is considering
funtherrelaxation, incknding expanding the power-s
fum banking orgaruizationus to underwu-ite secun’ities.
One major- meason fom’ permitting thue common
ownership of banuks arid firms in other industries
is based on concern about the n-ole ofbanks in
financial intermediation in the future. Some bank
customers have found cheaper sources of credit
and other financial services outside thue banking
industry. Consequently, some analysts say, restric-
tions must be relaxed ifbanks are to survive.’ The
punpose of this paper is to describe sever-al majom-
proposals for changing banking restrictions and to
‘These restrictions have not been applied to the ownership of
banks by individuals. Individuals who own bank stock may own
and operatefirms in any other industry. Under the Change in
Bank Control Act of 1978, individuals and groups of individuals
acting in concert must apply to the appropriate federalsupervi-
sory agency for permission to acquire the stock of a bank over
certain percentages ofownership. See Spong (1985), pp. 94—
95. The bank supervisory agencies may deny permission to




The purchase would create a monopoly in any part of the
banking industry,
The financial condition ofthe acquiring party could ad-
verselyaffect the bank, or
The competence, experience or integrity of the proposed
ownership would not be in the interest of the bank’s deposi-
‘Corrigan (1987), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (1987)
and Huertas (1986,1987).
tors.59




At pn’esent, the activities offeder-ally insured
cornmem-cial banks are limited essentially to ac-
cepting deposits, huolding m-elativelv low-risk secu-
rities and making loans. Banking organizations
muuay acquire firms engaged in financial activities
through bank holding companies tBHCst — corpo-
rations that own omue om’ nuome banks, In the Bank
Holding Company Act BHCA), Congress autho-
rized the Fedenal Reserve Boan’d to detem-nuine what
activities are permissible for BHCs; thuese activities,
accor-ding to thue act, shouhd be “so closely n-elated
to banking as to be aproper incident thereto,”
Banks genen-allycan engage in most activities that
BHCs are allowed to pursue. A major’ distinction
between luanks and the nonbank subsidiaries of
BHCs involves opportunities for geographic expan-
sion. The nonbank subsidiaries of BHCs may have
offices throughout the nation, wher-eas nationwide
branch banking is not pem’mitted.
h3HCs are subject to the supervision of the Fed-
eral Reserve, which periodically inspects them to
determine whethen- they are operating in a sound
manner and in compliance with regulations, in-
cluding the capital requirements setby the Fed-
enal Reserve.1 On sever-a] occasions, the Federal
Resemve Board has i-uled that BHCs could not un-
dertake certain activities because they were not
closely related to banking, might result in conflicts
of interest om nuight have subjected the BHCs to
greater- risk.’
Table 1
Restrictions on Credit Relationships
Between Commercial Banks and Their
Nonbank Affiliates
Restrictions in section 23A ofthe Federal Reserve Act:
Luar.s by banks to ro”rharc ailihacs “usi be ‘n, y and
adecuately coiratealizec
2 Tota c’odit tn any ole nonoank affiliate is lim’ted to 10
perueni 01 the oan.K S capimal
3 Combined credit to a nonhar’ a1-iates -s .mite C Mr 70
percem of the oar-cs capita:
4 Pjrurases by nan-cs of unsor.nU assots from qonharik
aft’ .ates are forbidthn
5. Bark t~ansaction~ w’th affiliates rinc.uarng :ransachons
covo’ed by Inc stntule anc ‘rarisactions specif cally
exemptl are to he on terms and cnnort:omis that arc
cor-s-stem with sate and sound oankir’g oract’c~s
Restrictions in section 23B of the Federal ReserveAct:
1 A banks transactions with.afti’,ates mist be or’ tenirs
anc undcr crcurnstances. iricludin’j credi: standares
s-milar to hose oftered to nonaffilia:ecompares
2 A bank ac.t:ng as a tiduc!ary shall nol ourchase
securities ‘ssuod by an affiliate u’iless sLrch purchases
are specified n the fiducrary agreemrerlt
3 A hamik sha not purchase secur:t,es being unde’wr’tte-i
by a securities atfirate
4 A oank sna. rrolstate or suggest that it is responsible for
Ihe obligations o~ its affiliates.
NOTE Legislation In 1982 removeo most of the resmrchons
on transactions between comm~rcia’ banks that are
s,jbsioiaries of the same corporation If a corporation
owns 80 percent or more ot the shares of its
subsidiary banks the only rest”iction on trar.sact-ors
between the subsrdiary banks is that one bank may
not sell lowouality assets from another bank in the
samne organizaton. See Rose and Tailey 19821
‘Spong (1985), pp. 95—98. The major exception tothis involves
the nonbank banks, The BHCA, which gave the Federal Re-
serve jurisdiction overthe acquisitions of banks by corpora-
tions, defined a bank asone that accepts demanddeposits and
makes commercialloans. Acquisitionsofinstitutions that did
not accept demand depositsor make commercial loans were
not subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Reserve in its
capacity asregulator of BHCs. These limited-service banks are
commonly called nonbank banks. The Competitive Equality
Banking Act of 1987 (CEBA) closes that loophole in the law. It
places restrictionson the growth and activities of nonbank
banks acquired on or before March 5, 1987, and requires firms
that acquired nonbank banks after that date to sell them or
restricttheir activities to those permissible for BHCs. The
following restrictions apply tononbank banks acquired on or
before March 5,1987:
(1) They may not engage in newactivities,
(2) They may not market the goods or services of affiliates or
have their banking services marketed through nonbank
affiliates,except through those marketing arrangements in
effect before March 5, 1987, and
(3) Beginning in August 1988, their assets may not rise by
more than 7 percent in any 12-month period.
CEBA also imposes restrictions on the daylight overdrafts of
nonbank banks,
Gilbert, Stone and Trebing (1985).
‘Volcker (1986), pp. 436—38. The following are some of the
activitiesnot permissiblefor BHCs and the dates of denials for
those activities by the Federal Reserve Board: underwriting
general life insurance (1971), real estate brokerage(1972),
land investment and development (1972), operating a savings
and loan association (1974), operating a travel agency (1976)
and acting as a specialist in foreign exchange options on a
security exchange (1986).60
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their own subsndrar ies 1 he Con ptm olher of the
Cun-mcncv determuuines which activities arc permis-
snhlr for subsidiarncs of national banks, these are
gener ally r estm’nrted to activities that are permissi
ble fom national banks themselves, In recent years,
GetS state go~ernnuemuts have alhot%ed suhsmdnanmes of
~tsganftnfl U~nflw~ state-cha tered banks to engage mn a ~ariety ofnew
activities; among thcse arc insurance, real estate
Ertrrsthatenga~a Pwmsengagsuuw -
nnufimuanuctat acttvt~cosntmy investment and securities underwriting
a v bartks bisetta All federally insured commercial banks arc sub
usnvetyaMd sSrdnonstn lImo .. -
tm ttseba$cs asea Ohdbbuse ject to iestrnctmons on tnansa( tions with thenr affihi
r*s ates’ thest rcstrictions are shown in tabhe 1 Thus
for example total loans to affiliates a -e limited to
‘0 percent of the banks capital. Additional rcstric-
tions apply to sales of assets to banks and pur-
chases b banks ofsecurities issucd by nonbank
affiliates or underwrittcn by securities affiliates as
ant ‘P*lrbntbatflowned well as restrictions on loan by banks to therm of-




Ihis section describes sx p ‘oposahs for restruc-
turing the U.S. banking system. Although others
could be included, particularly those deahing with
the cntrv of banks into specific industries, the
following proposals encompass the range of op-
tmarukssrrbpct a ownbaruhsniotanbject tions being considered in curt nt policy debates.
st~rvl~h byttu, Im upenvmsors The key features of these six proposa 5 are sum
fa4ealb~lk exc~pttoSty -
s pItisors S thosabanit manLcd in table 2. Fach proposal would permit
irrclSnflxercise hetdortly the banking omganiiatmons to engage in a broader
ofpowa eta trot des’~natedsats tange of a tivities than -urrently ahlovn,ed. Essen-
mu (suctras ate tially, the proposahs allow nonbanking services to
hc offct ed thmough corporate entities affiliates or
~ga’ancentra- subsidiaries) distinct fn’om the banks themselves.
trdftfttthetlnaflcraI Themeare two primuarv differences among the
proposals. Fit st, the differ on whether- to pennuit
nonfinancial firms to acquire banks orBHCs.




tobe ~ourca~ Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (1987), p. 106. This
sIte ~ forbank paper focuses on theissues involved in the commonowner- shipof commercial banks and firms in other industries. Non- ubsidians banking firms may offer a wide range of banking services by
acquiring savings and loan associations (S&Ls). Corporations
Current Banksubsidiesas in any industry other thansecurities underwriting may acquire
esirrotrons o’Iruonbenk rig mis one S&L each. Regulations prohibit lending by S&Ls to their
may Itodonly nonfinancial parentorganizations and restnct othertypes of
destgmuatedlow rsic transactions that could benefit the parent organization at the
tqtmtdasset expense ofthe S&L subsidiary. See Federal Home Loan Bank
________________________________________ Board (1986).
Spong (1985), pp 55—5862
policies necessary to avoid conflicts of interest,
decreased or unfair competition among firms of-
fering finaiucial services and undue concentration
of ecomuoruic resour-ces, Tlueseissues have been
discussed exteiusively elsewher’e; they are not ana-
lyzed in this articlei
Second, the pm-oposals differ on the policies
necessary to limit the risk assumed by banks, Note
that the proposals have some common features
designed to limit banking risk. Each proposal in
table 2 requires banking omganizations to offer’
nonhanking services tlumough subsidiaries or’ affili-
ates; moreover, each includes restrictions on
banks lending to their nonhank subsidiaries or
affiliates. l’hese proposals rely in part on the legal
concept of “corporate separateness,” under- which
the creditoms of acorporation have no legal claim
on the assets of a stockholder, even if that stock-
holder is another com-poration. ‘I’hus, creditor-s of
the nonbanking units of a firm that also owrus
banks would have no claim on its banks’ assets.”
Several proposals include special features to
limit the risk ofbank failure that might result from
affiliation ofbanks and nonbanking firms. The
Helter proposal IHeller- (1987)) r’equir-es BHCs to
absorb all losses incurred by their bank subsidi-
aries; nonfinancial firms that acquire BhiCswould
ahsomb all losses incurred by their Bl’tCs. The FUIC
proposal (Federal Deposit Insurance Corpomation
(1987)) requires bank supervisor-s to audit transac-
tions between banks and their nonbank affiliates
or subsidiaries to determine wluether they ar’e
detrimental to the banks. The Corrigan pm’oposal
(Corrigan (1987)) relies on direct supervision of the
firms that buy banks to limit the risk they assume.
Finally, the Litan proposal (titan (1987)( requires
bamukspumchased by nonbanking firms to hold
only low-risk liquid assets.”
A FRAMEWORK FOR AINALYZII~G
THE RISK OF BANK FAILURE
The pi-oposals for changing bank r-egulations ar-c
concem’nedwith their likely effect on bank failures.
This section illustrates how tlue probability ofbank
failure is affected when banks and nonbanking
Eimms combine.
KeyFactors 4ffecting the Profits and
Risks oj’Gnnthining Banks and
NOnbanking Firms~
Ifabank offer-snonbanking services, the effect
on both the expected rate of return and the varia-
bility of returns to thebank’s shareholders, as well
as the risk offailure for the bank, depend on five
factors. Suppose abank merges with anonbanking
firm. One important factor’ is the average level of
expected profits or rate of return for the nonbank-
ing service. A second factor is the “risk” associated
with the prospective nonbanking service; misk is
often measured by the standard deviation of the
profits om- rates ofmeturn. A thir-d factor is the cor-
relation between the profit rates ofthe bank and
aRose (1985).
9Black, Miller and Posner (1978).
“Similar proposals have been made byKareken (1986), Gilbert
(1987), Tobin (1987) and Forrestal (1987). Tobin proposes
limiting the assets of all banks to short-term, low-risk assets.
“Thefactors that determine the expected value and variance of
profits of afirm that buys a bank and a nonbanking firm can be
expressed in the following equations:
E(B + N) = E(B) + E(N),
V(B + N) V(B) + V(N) + 2COV(B,N),
where F refers toexpected value, V tovariance, B to the profits
of the bank, N to the profits of the nonbanking firm and COV to
the covariance of the profitsof the bank and the nonbanking
firm, Holding constant the covariance of the two profit streams,
a higher variance in the profits of the nonbanking firm means a
higher variance in the profits of the combined firms, The vari-
ance of the combined profit streams depends on the covari-
ance of the two profit streams. Finally,as the size of the non-
banking firm rises relative to the size of the bank, the variance
of the combined profit streams convergesto thevariance of the
profits of the nonbanking firm,
returns to shareholders of a firm that buys a bank and a non-
banking firm and operates them under the conditions ofthe
various proposals. One approach to this analysis might involve
expressing the mean and variance of the profitsof the firm that
buys the bank and the nonbankingfirm in termsof the mean
and variance of the profits ofthe bank and the nonbankingfirm
separately, as indicated in the equations above, The problem
with this approach is that the distribution ofreturns to share-
holders is not the same asthe distribution of profits. In some
outcomes, losses exceed the investmentof theshareholders;
losses to shareholders, however, are no larger thantheirin-
vestment in the firm, The distinction between the distribution of
profits and the distribution of returns to shareholders is espe-
cially important for this study, since the various proposals
involve different rules fortruncating the losses to shareholders,
Analysis of the mean and variance of returns to shareholders
must be basedon specific distributions of the profits of the
bank and the nonbanking firm, as presented in the text, not on
the expected value and variance of the profits.
An analysis of the proposals to restructure the financial
system involves an analysis of the mean and variance ofthe63
Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations of Profit Rates for Firms in




Industry equity (ROE) of ROE
Commercial banks 12.3°c 1 30.~
Thrift nstitutions 34 107
Securities brokers 130 40
Securities underwriters 16.4 57
Large investment banks on’y 21 5 77
Life insurance uqderwrtters 13.7 23
Property-casualty insurance underwriters 11.9 6 4
Insurance brokers and agents 122 41
All manulactunng 13 1 20
SOURCE Litan fi987i. o.64
nonhanking firm.A fourth factor is the size of the
bank relative to the nonbanking firm. The third
and fourth factors are important because the bank
may actually reduce its risk by acquiring a non-
banking firm that has a higher- coefficient ofvaria-
tion of profits than the bank. This possibility will
be demonstrated later’.
The fifth factor’that must he considered is the
“synergies” (increase in profitsi involved in com-
bining banking and nonbanking services in the
sanue organization. Offer-ingbanking and nonbank-
ing services through the same firm nuay reduce the
cost of providing the services and may attract cus-
tomers who value thewider’ ar-ray of services of-
fer-ed by the combined bank-nonbank firm, These
synergies could pm’oduce profit rates that exceed
the sum of the profit rates ofbanks and firms in
the nonbanking industry opemating as separate
corporations.
Some Empirical Estimates of Bates qf
Return and Risk
A nurrmbei of studies have investigated the profit
r’ates in banking and selected nonbank activities.”
One finding, demonsti-ated in table 3, is that both
the aver-age profit rate and its standard deviation
ar-clower in banking than in sever-al industries
that banks would be permitted to entei- under’ the
r-ecent proposals.” Indeed, the standai-d deviation
of return on equity, one measure of risk, is lowest
in table 3 for- the banking irudustry.Another key
finding of these studies is that the profit rates of
banks are not positively correlated with the profits
of firms in many industr-ies that they would be
pernutted to enter. Thus, banks could diver-sify
their risk by entering many nonhanking industries,
even if the profits offirms in those industries are
mor-e variable than those of banks.
“Eisenbeisand Wall (1984) survey the studies. For more recent
studies, seeBoyd and Graham (1988) and Macey, Marr and
Young (1987). There is evidence that BHCs reducetheir risk by
offering nonbanking services. See Boyd and Graham (1986),
Wall (1987) and Brewer (1988). The results of these studies do
not indicate the effects on risk of banking institutions entering
nonbanking industries as permissible under the proposals in
table 2. The nonbanking activities permissiblefor BHCs now
are primarily those permissible for banks, The diversificationof
risk achieved by offering the nonbanking services currently
permissible for BHCsmay reflect merely geographic diversifi-
cation,
“Somestudies measure returns to shareholders using data on
stock prices and dividends, These studies report similarpat-
terns: mean rates of returnand variability of returns to share-
holders are higher in several of the industries that banking
organizations would be permitted to enterthan in the commer-
cial banking industry. See Boyd and Graham (1988), Eisemann
(1976) and Macey, Marr and Young (1987).64
Table 4
Variability of Profits of Hypothetical Firms formed through the






Banks plUs savings aid loan asscciator’s 0 18
Banks oiLs personal creo’t agoncCs 0 24
Bankspus bus--iess credit agencies 02 2
Banks p us secLr,hos anc cornmnd:l e.s bro4ers 0 22
Banks p us -fe :nsuranre 0 15
Banks olus murrja; ‘nsu’ers 02 9
BanKsplus insurance agents 0 15
Banks pius rcai eslate opera’o’~ ard essnrs 020
Banks pus subd.v,ders and cevelopers 0 20
NOTE A t.me series of lie prof1s of eacn h.ypotbetica: firm is ‘n’rnec by assLrmnq hal 75 percent of
tie assets 0! Inc hyootnnt~cal firm are devotec to hankirc arid 25 oercer.l arc devo~cd tc the
rorbanking act v ly Tie coef~ic-er’l 0 valalion is .cer:vel fo’ tile corstruc.tec ‘mc- 5cr es
SOURCE. Litan fl9Bfl. p 88
Table 4 illustrates the potential reduction in
variability ofbank profits possible through mer’-
gers with fir-ms that offer other- financial services.
The table illustrates this with the coefficient of
variation, ameasure of relative risk that is calcu-
lated by dividing the standard deviation of the
profit matesby the mean. The r-esults demonstrate,
using a hypothetical situation involving the rela-
tive size of banking and nonbanking components
ofthe firm, that the combined firm can have the
same or evenlower risk than the hank itseli~ even
though risk is higher- in the nonhanking industries
The effects of per-mitting hankirug organizations
to offer- nonbanking services on the risk and re-
rur-ns in banking are analyzed using two pr-ohahil-
ity distributions of profits, one for a hypotluetical
hank and another- for’ a nonhanking firm. These
probability distr-ibutions, presented in table 5, ar-c
designed to r-efiectthe results of studies ofrisk
and returns in banking atud various nonbankirig
industries sumnuarized above. Profit distributions
are combined in table 6 under var-ious assunup-
tions that reflect the proposals for’ r-estm-ucturirug
the 1930s, securities affiliates of commercial banks
held a large sham-e of tlue investment banking busi-
ness.” In nations where commer-cial banking or-ga-
nizations nuay offer investment banking services,
comnuer’cial banking om-ganizations have large
shares ofthe investruuent banking business.”
An Illustration
Because banks have notyet entered the various
nonbanking industries, there is little evidence on
the magnitude of the synergies involved in coruu-
bining banks with other firms.’~There is evidence,
however, of svnergies for banks and selected finan
cial activities. For example, hefor-e the separ-ation
of conunuercial banking and investment banking iru
‘~Several studies estimate the effects of the combination of
services offered bybanks on their costs. See Gilligan and
Smirlock (1984) and Benston, et. al, (1983). The results of
thesestudies are not relevant in estimating the effects of non-
bankingservices on the costs ofbanks, since the data are for
banks subject to current limitations on the services they may
offer.
“White(1986).
“Daskin and Marquardt (1983).65
Table 5
Probability Distributions of the Profits
of a Bank and a Nonbanking Firm Prior
to Merger or Affiliation
Bank
Return to
Outcome Probability Profits shareholders
A 001 $1U $100




Outcome Probability Profits shareholders
A 005 $115 $100
B 090 15
C 005 125 145
Nonbanking
Bank firm
Expoc:eo ‘eturn to sI’aro’ro aers
as a pe’cenfage of capra 10 1 ~o 1575”,
~ocflic’ent0 va’iat on of returns
to sI’areholoers 6117 24637
Expected r’ss ton e FDIC SO 10
the Iinancial system described in table 2. Table 7
shows the returns to shareholder-s and the cx-
pected loss to the FDIC for the four cases analyzed
in table 6.
The illustration is designed to he simple. Differ-
ences arnorug the four cases might change under
assumptions that would make the analysis more
complex. For’ instance, the management of the
fir-rnthat buys the bank and the nonhanking firm
is assumed to make no changes that affect the
capital ratios or the probability distributions of
pi-ofits. Analysis of the cases under alternative
assunuptions is beyond the scope ofthis paper.
The bank begins the current year wuth book
value of equity equal to $100. The market value of
the hank is assumed to equal its hook value prior
to financial restructuring which pernuits tlue af-
filiation of the bank with the nonhanking firnu. As
presented in table 5, the (discrete; probability dis-
tributioru ofthe bank’s pr-ofits in the current year
has three possible outcomes: a 1 percent chance
of aloss of $110, which would cause thebank to
fail, a 98 percent chance of a pmofit of 510 (a 10
percent r-eturn on equity) and a I per-ceril chance
of a profit of 5130.”
‘i’able S also presents the probability distribu-
tion of profits of a nonhanking firm that, begins the
year with hook value capital of $100. The market
value of the nonhanking firm is also assumed ini-
tially to equal 5100. The nonbanking firm is riskier
than the hank: the coefficient of variation of its
profits is higher than that of the bank. This speci-
fication was chosen to reflect the gm-eatervariability
of pr’ofits shown in table 3 in some of the indus-
tries that banking institutions wish to enter.
The effects of combining the bank and the non-
banking firm in the sanue corporation are exam-
ined using thr-ee indicators: the expected return to
shareholders as apercent of capital, the coefficient
of variation of returns to shareholders of the con-
solidated firm, and the expected loss to the FDIC
from the hank’s failure. These measures are calcu-
lated in table S for-both the bank and the non-
banking firm as separate organizations to provide
benchmarks for comparison. The distribution of
returns to shareholders differs from the distribu-
tion ofprofits because losses to shareholders are
limited to the amount of their initial investment in
tlue firm. Thus, losses to shareholders am-c limited
to $100 for the bank and $100 for the nonbanking
firm. The expected loss to the FDIC is calculated
as fbllows. The bank fails in only one of the three
possible outcomes: a loss of $110, with a chance of
1 percent. The loss to the FDIC in that outcome
would be 510, since the initial capital of the hank
is $100. Thus, the expected loss to the FD1C is $10
(loss to FDIC) X 0.01 (probability; = $0.10.
In deriving the distribution of returns to share-
holders in table (3, one must specifi’ their invest-
ment, which determines their’ maximum loss and
the denominator used in calculating their ex-
pected rate of return. The shareholders’ initial
investment is measur-ed as the book value of the
combined firms. The use ofbook value, net of any
accounting goodwill resulting from the acquisition
of the bank and the nonbanking firm, provides a
“The large profit of the bank associated with the small probabil-
ity might reflect the recovery on loans previously charged off as
losses or a large favorable change in market interest rates on
portfolios of assets and liabilities that do not have matched
duration.6667
Table 7
Returns to Shareholders and Losses to the FOIC Under Various




Means of as a variation of loss
Case combining percentage returns to to the
number the firms ofcapital shareholders FDIC
1 Merger 12.51% 17754 $00125
2 Affiliahon, 1293 1 6278 01000
corporate
separateness
3 Affiliation 12.88 1.6434 00050
Heller
prOposai







basis for speci~’ingbankruptcy. Book value also
provides acommon denominator for comparisons
of expected rates of return in the various cases.
The market value of the firm that buys the bank
and the nonbanking firm will exceed their com-
bined book value. Ifthis were not the case, the
combination of these fir-ms in the same corpora-
tion would not benefit the shareholder-s.
i’he profits oftlue bank and the nonbanking firm
areassumed to be statistically independent and,
thus, uncorrelated. This assumption simplifies the
analysis; it is also consistent with some of the evi-
dence cited pr’eviously for sever-al industries that
banks could enter. For each outcome for the
profits of thebank, there are three possible out-
comes for the prohts of the nonbanking firm, If
combined into one firm, ther’e would be nine pos-
sible outcomes for the retur-ns to shareholder’s of
the consolidated firm, as table 6 illustrates.
Tables 6 and 7 ignore the existence ofsynergies
fiom conubining a bank with anonbanking firm;
they assume that there is no incr’ease in the joint
profits resulting fi’onu lower- costs or- a wider- array
ofservices to offer customer-s. As prevrously men-
tioned, it is difficult to determine the magnitude of
such synergies, given that such combinations have
been unlawful for many years. Such synergies, of
cour-se, must exist to make such combinations
attractive to shareholders; investors can easily
obtain thebenefits of diversification by owning
shares of firms with uncorrelated profits-In this
paper~however, assumptions about the size of the
synergies are unnecessary; the relevant compari-
sons are made between thevarious cases. An in-
crease in the levels ofprofits foreach outcome
would not alter’the differences among the four
cases examined in tables 6 and 7, unless the syn-
ergies eliminate bankruptcy in all outcomes.
Merger of the Bank and the
Aionbanking Firm: The Simplest Case
Each proposal described in table 2 calls for’ the
new activities of banking organizations to be con-
ducted thr’ough corpor’ate entities that are sepa-
rate from banks. This feature of the proposals
reflects the view that the chances of bank failure
and the potential loss to the FDIC would be higher
if the organizations that own banks offered non-
banking senjces thi-ough their- bank subsidiaries,
rather than through subsidiaries that are separate
from the banks.68
This view is not valid under all circumstances,
as case I in tables 6 and 7 illustrates. In this case,
the hank begins offering nonhanking services by
merging with the nonbanking firm that has the
profit distribution presented in tables. The capital
of thebank after the merger is $200. Given the
underlying profit distributions in table 5, there is
only one outcome in which the bank fails: in out-
come # I, the returns from thebanking and non-
banking activities yield the largest possible losses.
In that outcome, the shareholders lose their total
investment. The bank remains in operation in all
of the other outcomes. In outcomes #2 and #3,
in which the losses from banking operations are
large enough to make the bank fail if operating as a
separate corporation, the profits from the non-
banking operations and the increased capital of
the bank resulting from the merger keep the hank
from failing.
The expected loss to the FOIC in case I depends
on what happens to the liabilities of the nonbank-
ing firm after the merger. Suppose the nonbanking
segment of the merged firm continues to borrow
from the same sources it used before the merger.
Ifthe claims of these lenders are subordinated to
the claims of depositors, the merger might reduce
the expected loss to the FDIC, perhaps to zero.
In this illustration, however, the merged organi-
zation converts all of its liabilities to federallyin-
sured deposits. Ifthebank involved in the merger
goes bankrupt, the FD1C absorbs losses above the
capital of $200. tn outcome # 1, because the
bank’s maximum loss after its merger with the
nonbanking firm is $225, the loss to the FDIC is
$25. Although the maximum loss to the FDIC is
larger after the merger, the expected loss ($25 X
0.0005) is actually smaller after the merger (com-
pare tables S and 7).
The effects that amerger have on the possibility
of bank failure and the expected loss to the FD1C
depend on thesize of the nonbanking firm relative
to the bank.To illustrate, suppose the bank
merges with a nonbanking firm whose distribution
ofprofits is 10 times as large for each outcome as
that presented in table 5 and whose capital is
$1,000. In this case, which is not shown in the
table, the expected loss to the FDIC would he
$2.04, much larger than the expected loss shown
in table 7. Thus, in considering arestructuring of
the financial system, the size of thebank relative
to the nonbanking firm is an important determi-
nant of the expected loss to the FDIC.
4fflhiation qfa flank with a
Nonbanking Firm
Ifbanks comnbine tvith nonhanking (irms, one
wayto limit the FDIC’s expected loss is to require
that banks remain separate corporations within
their parent organizations and limit FDIC insur-
ance only to the deposit liabilities of the banks.
Within such structures, the principle of corporate
separateness would prevent the nonbanking firm’s
creditors fi’om claiming the assets of the bank.
The risk and return characteristics of a holding
company that buys the bank and the nonhanking
firm are presented in case 2. Under this case, la-
belled affiliation, corporate separateness,” losses
to shareholders of the holding company resulting
from losses by the nonbank subsidiary are limited
to the capital of the nonbank subsidiary. The bank
does not rescue the nonbank subsidiary by ab-
sorbing the additional losses. In turn, ifthe bank
has losses that exceed its capital, the nonbank
subsidiary does not rescue the hank by absorbing
the additional losses. There is assumed to be no
lending among units of the holding company. The
holding company lends to neither the bank nor
the nonbank subsidiary, amid the bank lends noth-
ing to the nonbank affiliate. The nonbank affiliate
borrows, instead, from nonaffiliated lenders; the
liabilities ofthe bank are covered by FDIC insur-
ance.
The expected return to the shareholders is
higher and the variability ofreturns is lower in
case 2 than under asimilar combination of firms
arranged through a merger. Thus, the sharehold-
ersbenefit more from a combination of the bank
and the nonbanking firm as aftiliates of aholding
company than through the merger ofthese firms.
The benefit to the shareholders, however, comes
partly at the expense ofthe FDIC. The FDIC’s ex-
pected loss is the same in case 2 as in the ben-
chmark case in table S but higher than under the
merger. tinder affiliation and corporate separate-
ness, the outcomes in which the FUIC is exposed
to losses are determined by the probability distri-
bution of the hank’s profits. Under the merger
illustrated in case I, in contrast, losses in out-
comes # 2 and # 3 that would make the bank fail
are absorbed by the profits of the nonbank seg-
ment of the merged firm and the capital contrib-
uted by the nonbanking unit. Under affiliation and
corporate separateness, however, the expected
loss to the FOIC does not depend on the size of




The cases in tables 6 and 7 indicate that, under
some conditions, the risk of F’IJIC loss would be
lower if abank engages in a nonbanking activity
directly, rather than through affiliation with a non—
banking firm. In considering proposals for’ finan-
cial restr’ucturing, therefore, it is unnecessary to
prohibit the direct offering of nonhanking services
through banks under’ all circumstances.
The Financial Services Holding
Company (FSHC) Proposal
The proposals by the Association of Bank Hold-
ing Companies (LaWar’e 1987)) and the Associa-
tion of Reserve City Bankers (1987)would permit
FSI-ICs to acquire banks as subsidiaries under the
condition of affiliation and corporate separate-
ness. The bank could not use its assets to rescue a
failing nonbank affiliate, and the FSI-JC would not
he required to rescue afailing hank.
A comnparison of case 2 in table 7 with table 5
shows how the formation of FSHCs can affect risk
in banking. Affiliation of ahank with a nonbanking
firm reduces the probability that thehank will fail
only if affiliation yields synergies that raise the
profits of the bank for each possible outcome.
Thus, affiliations between banks and nonbanking
firms that facilitate diversification of risk for share-
holdems ofbanking firms reduce the probability of
bank failure and the expected loss to the EDIC
on/v if there are synergies from combining banking
and nonhanking firms in the same organization.
The Heller “Double liEnbreila”
Proposal
The distribution ofreturns to shareholders un-
der the BelIer (1987) proposal is presented under
case 3 in table 6. The implications of this proposal
can he illustrated by comparing the distribution of
returns to shareholders under various outcomes
in cases 2 and 3. Under the Heller proposal, the
losses of the hank and nonbank subsidiary in out-
come # 1 absorb all of the capital of the holding
company. The FDIC has aloss of $10 in that out-
come, the amount by which the loss of the hank
exceeds its capital. In outcome # 2, the bank has a
loss that exceeds its capital, but the holding com-
pany is required to cover that loss, drawing on its
pmofit of$15 from the nonbanking subsidiary and
its capital. The holding company also covers the
large loss of the bank in outcome # 3. In outcomes
# 4 and # 7, in contrast, the holding company
does not absorb all ofthe losses ofthe nonhanking
subsidiary, Instead, the nonhanking subsidiary
goes bankrupt. The holding company writes off its
investment of $100, and nonaftiliated lenders ab-
sorb the additional loss of $15 in each of these
outcomes.
The minimum level of synergies necessary to
make combinations ofbanks and nonhanking
firms attractive to investors is higher under the
I-teller pr’oposal than under’ the NI-IC proposal.
The diversification ofrisk illustrated in case 2
could he achieved through a mutual hind that
buys shares in firms in banking and nonbanking
industres. Any synergies would make the share-
holders’ expected rate of return higher with the
bank and nonbanking firm combined in the finn
under affiliation and corporate separateness than
through amutual fund. To make combinations of
banks and nonbanking firms under the Heller
proposal attractive to shareholders, synergies
would have to exceed a level necessary to com-
pensate the holding company for the expected
cost of bailing out the failing bank subsidiary.
The synergies necessary to make the affiliation
ofbanks with nonbanking firms profitable under
the Heller proposal would be different for each
potential combination offirms. For case 3, the
svnemgies would have to raise the returns to share-
holders by $0095 to make them equal to the ex-
pected returns to shareholders in case 2, and even
more to compensate shareholders for the higher
variability ofreturns in case 3.
The Corrigan Proposal
Corrigan (1987) assumes that the methods of
insulating banks built into the proposals for FSHCs
will be ineffective. This view is based on evidence
that BHCs are integrated organizations that have
used all of their resources, including those oftheir
bank subsidiaries, to support anynonbank subsid-
iary in danger of failing. Corrigan also expresses
concern that, in approving the acquisition of
banks by nonbanking firms, the federal supeivi-
sory authorities will extend the federal safety net
to the parent organizations themselves.
TheEffects of Loans to Nonbank Affiliates on
Stockholder Wealth — The Corrigan proposal
reflects these views on the relationship between
banks and their parent organizations. Case 4 in
tables 6 and 7 examines whether such concerns
reflect rational, profit-maximizing behavior. The70
Corrigan proposal assumes that firms are willing
to risk the assets of their bank subsidiaries to aid
their’ nonbank subsidiaries. One way for a holding
company to do this is to allow thebank to lend
directly to the nonbank subsidiary. To illustrate
this, the bank in case 4 lends $10 to the nonbank
affiliate at azero interest rate, thus subsidizing the
nonbank subsidiary at the expense of the bank.
Several assumptions have been made to derive
the probability distributiomi of returns for share-
holders ofthe holding company. First, the bank
loan is assumed to be subordinated to other debt
of the nonbank affiliate. tfthe nonbank affiliate
goes bankrupt, therefore, the bank absorbs the
first $10 of losses to creditors. Second, the interest
rate on riskless assets is assumed to be 5 percent.
The distribution of profits for the bank is derived
by subtracting $0.50 from the profits for each pos-
sible outcome presented in table 5; this reduction
reflects the opportunity cost of foregoimigan alter-
native investment of $10 at the riskless rate.
Thenonbank subsidiary saves $1053 in interest
expense on the $10 it borrows from the bank; this
is the amount that arisk-neutral lender charges to
compensate for the risk-free rate of5 percent and
the 5 percent chance of losing the $10 principal
and foregoing the interest income ifthe nonbank-
ing firm goes bankrupt.’8
The effects of this loan on the distribution of
shareholders’ returns are illustrated in table 6
under case 4. In outcomes # 1, #4 and # 7,the
bankruptcy of the nonbanking firm imposes an
additional loss of$10 on the bank. In outcome # 1,
in which the bank has its largest losses, the FDIC
absorbs aloss of $20.50 ($10 loss from the underly-
ing distribution in tables, $0.50 loss of interest
income on the loan to the nonbank affiliate and
$10 loss on the loan to the nonbank affiliate).
The cost saving by the nonbank affiliate due to
thezero interest loan from the bank raises the
returns to shareholders by $1053 in all outcomes
except those in which the nonbank affiliate goes
bankrupt. The return to shareholders is $0.01
higher in case 4 than in case 2; this difference is
not large enough, however, to raise the expected
rate of return in table 7 by I basis point. The im-
portant difference between the distributions of
returns in case 4 and case 2i sthat the coefficient
ofvariation of the returns is higher in case 4. Thus,
it is not in the shareholders’ interest to have their
bank lend to its nonbank subsidiary, even at a
subsidized rate. Such loans make their returns
more variable.
Typically, bank supervisors would make such a
loan even less attractive to the shareholders. Be-
cause the loan to the nonbank affiliate raises the
expected loss to the FDIC, bank supervisors would
require the bank to maintain a higher capital ratio.
Though the bank could raise its capital ratio by
reducing its total assets while keeping its capital
unchanged, the asset reduction would reduce the
level ofprofits for each possible outcome the bank
faces.
This analysis is consistent with evidence that
fewbanks make loans to their nonbank affiliates
up to the limits allowed by regulation. Rose and
Talley (1983) exannne transactions among affiliates
of 224 ofthe 229 BHCs that filed reports with the
Federal Reserve from the fourth quarter of1975
through the fourth quar’ter of 1980. In 1980, 27
percent of the BHCs had no transactions among
affiliates. Among the 16 BHCs in which the bank
subsidiaries made larger loans to the nonbank
affiliates than the nonbank affiliates made to the
banks, loans to the nonbank affiliates in 1980 were
only 1.3 percent of the capital of thebank subsidi-
aries.
Banking Risk under Assumptions Other Than
Profit Maximization — The distribution of returns
in cases 2 and 4 reflect the assumption that, ifthe
bank does not lend to the nonbank affiliate, the
affiliate’s bankruptcy does not affect thebank’s
profits. In afew cases, however, the bankruptcy of
anonbank subsidiary ofa holding company has
induced depositors to withdraw their deposits
from the bank subsidiary.’°The management of a
holding company, therefore, might justify loans
from abank subsidiary to anonbank affiliate as a
way to prevent the nonbank subsidiary from going
tmThe interest rate that the nonbank affiliate would pay to borrow
from a nonaffiliated lender is determined bycalculating the rate
that would make the expected return on such a loan equal to
the risk-tree interest rate. Let rI be the interest rate on the loan
and rs the risk-free rate. In lending $10 to the nonbank affiliate,
there is a9 5percent chance of collecting the principalplus
interest at the rate rI and a 5 percent chance of losing the
principaland collecting no interest. The expected returns on
the alternative investments are calculated as follows:
rl / $10 / 0.95 — $10 / 0.05 = rs / $10.
If rs is 5 percent,
rl = [0.05 + 0.05] + 0.95 = 0.1053.
‘9Cornyn, et. al. (1986).71
bankrupt and thus make depositors less con-
cerned about the safety oftheir deposits. In this
case, the costs ofbailing out the nonbankimig sub-
sidiary might be less than the cost ofadverse reac-
tion by depositors.
There have been several cases in which the
management ofa BHC used the resources of a
bank subsidiary to aid a nonbank affiliate in dis-
tr’ess. In the mid-1970s, for example, the holding
company that owned the l-tamilton National Bank
of Chattanooga, Tennessee, arranged forthe bank
to buy low-quality mortgages from a mortgage
banking affiliate. The mortgage purchase was an
important factor that led to the failure of the
bank.” In October 1987, to cite another case, the
Continental Illinois National Bank made a loan
that exceeded its limit forloans to one customer
to a subsidiary that deals in options. The subsidi-
ary suffered a large loss afterthe sharp fall in stock
prices that month.
The rationalization behind bank loans to bail
out the nonbank affiliate overlooks an alternative
that might be more favorable to the shareholders
ofthe holding company: let the nonbank subsidi-
ary go bankrupt and sell the bank to another
party. Losses to the holding company would be
limited to its investment in the nonbank subsidi-
ary, with nonaffihiated lenders forced to absorb
any additional losses. Ifpotential bidders are con-
cerned that the bank made loans to the failing
nonbank affiliate or in some way assumed respon-
sibility for the debts of that affiliate, the FDIC
could facilitate the sale by offering to reimburse
the winning bidder for any losses resulting from
the failure of the nonbank affiliate.
Management of the holding company may pre-
fer to have the bank absorb the losses necessary to
bail out the failing nonbank affiliate, rather than
sell the bank, which will result in the loss of their’
jobs. It may be in management’s interest to ar-
range for the bank to lend tothe nonbank subsidi-
ary and pray that some favorable outcome helps
the holding company remain solvent. The possi-
bility ofsuch action is why government supemvi-
sors must remain aware of any financial problems
in firms that own banks and must subject the bank
subsidiaries of those firms to particularly close
supervision.
The analysis in tables 6 and 7 ofa bank lending
to its nonbank affiliate is based on the assumption
that the loan is used for legitimate business pur-
poses. Loans from abank to anonbank affiliate, of
cour’se, could he made for fraudulent purposes.
Suppose abank is permitted to make a loan of any
amount to an affiliate. One method of stealing
from abank would he to buy the bank through a
holding company, arrange for aloan that ex-
ceeded the investment of the holding company in
the hank and disappear with the proceeds of the
loan.
The potential for fraud indicates that it may be
prudent to prDhibit loans to affiliates that exceed
the capital of abank. This pr’ohibition would not
prevent all forms of fraud in banking but its viola-
tion would indicate to the bank supervisors when
abank is vulnerable to this type of fraud. It is also
pr’udent to screen the background of those who
buy banks through holding companies, as the
federal bank regulatory agencies do when individ-
uals buy banks.
‘rhe FDIC (1987) proposal calls for greater au-
thority to audit the terms of any loans banks make
to affiliates or subsidiaries. This proposal does not
indicate what bank examiners would look for in
such audits. Audits to detect fraud would be ap-
pr’opriate.
The Safe Bank Proposal
The so-called safe bank pr’oposal (Litan 1987)) is
intended to reduce the expected level and stand-
ard deviation of profit rates of banks subject to the
safe bank” asset restrictions. As the appendix
indicates, for each $100 of assets shifted from busi-
ness loans to Treasury bills, the revenue of the safe
hank would decline by $1.26. The asset limitations
for safe banks maybe so restrictive that they
would prevent many affiliations ofbanks with
nonbanking firms that would promote diversifica-
tion or benefit society through synergies.
One way to evaluate the safe banking proposal is
to compare the size of the synergies necessary to
make bank acquisitions profitable for nonbanking
firms to the syner-gies necessary under alternative
proposals. Suppose the hank had loans of $600.” If
thebank becomes a safe bank by reinvesting the
$600 in Treasury bills, its revenue falls by $7.56. It
“Ibid., p. 186.
“Suppose the bank has a capital~to~asset ratio of 10 percent.
For all federally insured commercial banks, the average ratio of
loans to assets is about 60 percent. Thus, $600 is a reasonable
level for loans of the hypothetical bank with capital of $100 and
a1 0percent capital ratio.72
must, however, continue to pay competitive inter-
est r-ates on deposits after becoming asubsidiary
to avoid a decline in its deposits. Thus, synergies
from the operation of the bank as a subsidiary
must be worth at least $7.56 to the holding com-
pany. This amount can be compared to the syner--
gies necessary to make the acquisition of abank
subsidiary profitable under the Heller proposal,
which is $0095 for the case examined above.
This lar-ge difference reflects the fact that the
safe bank proposal imposes a significant opportu-
nity cost on anonbanking firm that buys ahank
under each possible outcome. The Helier pro-
posal, on the other hand, imposes aloss on the
nonbanking firmunder- an unlikely outcome —
the failure of the bank subsidiary. These compari-
sons suggest that fewer combinations of banking
and nonbanking firms that would promote diversi-
fication of risk and, possibly, mor’e efficient use of
resources would be viable under the safe bank
proposal than under- the Heller proposal.
CONCLUSIONS
Several barriers separ’ating banking from other
industries have been removed in recent years,
while Congress debates amore complete restruc-
turing of the financial system. Much evidence
indicates that banking organizations could diver-
si~yriskby affiliating with flr’ms in awide variety of
other industries, even those with more variable
profits than the banking industry. ‘rhis paper illus-
trates the potential for risk diversification through
the common ownership of ahypothetical bank
and nonbanking firm.
The illustration has several implications for
current proposals for restructuring the financial
system. Banks ar-c not necessarily made safer by
requiring that all nonbanking activities be con-
ducted through separate subsidiaries. Onthe con-
trary, banks maybe less vulnerable to failure if
some nonbanking activities are offered through
the banks directly. Moreover, the expected loss of
federal deposit insurance funds may be lower
even ifthe nonbanking activities are financed
through insured deposits.
The major proposals forrestr’ucturing the finan-
cial system would permit firms in various indus-
tries to buy banks and operate them as separate
subsidiaries. Some of the proposals build in safe-
guar-ds to prevent nonbanking firms from using
the resources of their bank subsidiaries in ways
that would increase both the chance forbank fail-
ure and the expected loss of the federal deposit
insurance funds. These r-estrictions are based oru
the presunuption that, without such safeguards,
nOnbanking firnuswould use the resour’ces of their
bank subsidiaries to benefit their’nonharuk subsidi-
aries.
The analysis in this paper- indicates that the
shareluolders of aholding company generally do
not benefit by luaving their bank subsidiary lend at
a subsidized interest rate to the nonbank subsidi-
ary. In fact, shareholders are made worse offby
such transactions because the holding company
profits become more variable. Tr-ansactions that
benefit nonbank subsidiaries at the expense of
hank subsidiaries do not increase the sharehold-
ers’ wealth. The greatest danger in banks lending
to affiliates involves management of holding com-
panies attempting to save their jobs by bailing out
nonbank subsidiaries and fraudulent schemes to
steal from banks through loans to affiliates.
Two of the proposals place special corustraints
on the nonbanking firms that buy banks to limit
the risks ofbank failure. One proposal requires
that the holding companies absorb all losses in-
cur’red by banks, up to the holding company’s
total capital. The other proposal requires the bank
subsidiaries of nonbanking firms to hold only low-
risk liquid assets. Both proposals raise the level of
synergies necessary to make the acquisition of
banks by nonbanking firms profitable. Ofthese
pr-oposals, the safe banking proposal is the more
restrictive. Some consolidations of banking and
nonbanking finns that would yield social benefits
in the form of higher’ profits and reduced variation
in stockholder returns would not be attractive to
shareholders under the safe banking proposal hut
would be attractive under- other pr-oposals.
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Appendix
The Opportunity Cost OfHolding Safe Assets
The safe bank proposal Litan 1987)) would put
the bank subsidiaries of nonhanking firms at a
disadvantage in competing for deposits by restrict-
ing the r’eturn oru their- investments. This disadvan-
tage could be offset slightly by waiving deposit
insurance premiums for’ the subsidiaries of non-
banking firms. Under the requirements for holding
only safe assets, the subsidiaries of nonbanking
firms would not expose the federal deposit insur-
ance funds to potential losses; therefore, an argu-
ment could be made for exempting “safe” banks
from deposit insurance premiums.
The opportunity cost of investing in Treasury
securities instead of loans is estimated using data
from thefunctional cost analysis program of the
Federal Reserve. A change in the composition ofa
bank’s assets affects its interest revenue and ex-
penses. The functional cost data includes informa-
tion on interest income and expenses allocated to
various categories of loans, as well as expenses
involved in purchasing and holding securities,
Table Al indicates that the gross yields on loans
almost always exceed those on three-month flea-
sury bills. Net yields on loans, which reflect ex-
penses and losses, are lower’ than the net yields
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yields on ‘Treasurybills and those on three catego-
des of loans. Net yields on mor’tgages and install-
ment loans tend to fall below the net yields on
Treasur bills in periods of sharp increases in
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interest rates. The most stable spread is that be-
tween the net yield on commercial and other
loans and the net yield on Treasury securities. On
average, banks lose $1.26 in net income before
income taxes per dollar’ tr-ansferi’ed from commer-
cial loans to Treasury bills.
TabIeA2
Sacrifice of Income Before Income Taxes per $100 Dollars of
Loans Shifted to Treasury Bills